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Shakespeare and the Making of  
Early Modern Science:  
Resituating Prospero’s Art 
Elizabeth Spiller
  
Florida State University 
Some readers may ask what it means to use the term “science” in con-
junction with Shakespeare. From a modern perspective, science may 
not seem to be able to tell us much about Shakespeare or Shakespeare 
about science. Looking backwards, it is fair to say that Aristotle would 
probably have agreed with such a perspective: what scholasticism 
came to call scientia has nothing to do with ars. In between Aristotle 
and Einstein, though, matters stood differently. The late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth century saw the historic transition from Aristotelian 
models of scientia to modern “science.” Both classic and modern epis-
temologies of science exclude art, but the crucial transition from the 
first to second was itself largely achieved by art. Art unexpectedly be-
came the mediating term that made it possible for early modern intel-
lectual culture to abandon Aristotelian scholasticism and move toward 
experimentalism and fact-based knowledge models. For Aristotle, var-
ious forms of making, doing, and knowing were all means by which 
“the soul possesses truth,” but only scientific knowledge was certain 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Ar-
istotle. 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), VI, 3, 1039b15–17. 
Further references from Aristotle are from this edition. 
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 3, 1139b20–25. 
3. This essay draws upon two important arguments that have dominated work in 
the history of science concerning the emergence of fact-based, experimental and 
mathematical sciences in the seventeenth century. The first pursues the claim that 
craft traditions, not university philosophy, provided the basis for the emergence 
of new scientific practices in the seventeenth century. See, most notably, Edgar 
and, indeed, truly scientific.1 In the early modern period, though, those 
kinds of making and doing that Aristotle had distinguished from true 
knowledge came to have a new epistemological status. For a brief pe-
riod in intellectual history, art was accepted as what I would like to 
call a knowledge practice. Aristotelian understandings of knowledge as 
eternal, unchanging, and “that which cannot be otherwise” involved a 
fundamental exclusion of the human from its categories;2 the historic 
shift in the early modern period away from that model of knowledge 
thus required the interjection of the human, the introduction of var-
ious forms of human invention and intervention, that is to say, art, 
into what counted as knowledge. In the mechanical arts (such as sur-
veying, architecture, metallurgy, printing, alchemy, Paracelsian med-
icine, and drama), the act of creation was understood to both require 
and express knowledge. Through a new assessment of the possibili-
ties of invention-artificial contrivances and human interventions of 
the kinds proposed by Francis Bacon and others—oddities that were 
once classified as the domain of the theologian and the natural histo-
rian became the basis for the new science of experimentalism. 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest both depicts and participates in this 
transition. Prospero’s “Art” expresses the remarkable power of this 
model of art as a knowledge practice; yet, as we shall see, the play also 
suggests reasons why the Renaissance conception of art as knowledge 
was ultimately displaced by a modern science of facts. This essay of-
fers a local reading of how art functions as a form of knowledge in 
The Tempest. From a larger theoretical perspective, the lesson I would 
draw from The Tempest is that in order to understand how poetry and 
drama shared in the emergent scientific cultures of early modern Eng-
land we must recognize that art was not separate from the practices 
that became science but instrumental to them.3 
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Zilsel, “The Sociological Roots of Science,” Social Studies of Science 30.6 (2000): 
935–49; rpt. from The American Journal of Sociology 49 (1942): 544–62; Zilsel, 
“The Origins of William Gilbert’s Scientific Method,” Journal for the History 0f 
Ideas 2.1 (1941): 1–32; Antonio Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and 
the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); and 
Paolo Rossi, Philosophy, Technology. and the Arts in the Early Modern Era, trans. 
Salvator Attanasio, ed. Benjamin Nelson (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). The 
second suggests that the epistemological significance of matters of fact and indi-
vidual observations changed during this period. See, among others, Peter Dear, 
Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Charles B. Schmitt, “Experience and Ex-
periment: A Comparison of Zabarella’s View with Galileo’s in De motu,” Studies in 
the Renaissance 16 (1969): 80–138; Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in 
Seventeenth Century England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Lor-
raine Daston, “Baconian Facts, Academic Civility, and the Prehistory of Objectiv-
ity,” Annals of Scholarship 8 (1991): 337–64; Daston, “Reviews on Artifact and 
Experiment; the Factual Sensibility,” Isis 79 (1988): 452–70. In their introduc-
tion to the outstanding Cambridge History 0f Science, Katharine Park and Lor-
raine Daston comment on the integration between natural philosophy and both 
art and literature: they note, “headings of the form ‘Science and X,’ although per-
haps helpful to orient modern readers, presume autonomous fields of activity that 
in many cases had yet to crystallize as such [...] Some forms of early modern art 
and literature were also so tightly intertwined with coeval natural inquiry that 
it is more accurate to treat them as expressions of a common endeavor” (‘’The 
Age of the New,” The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 3, Early Modern Science 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 12). I would simply emphasize 
that art was, in this period, understood to be necessary to the practices that cre-
ated knowledge as well as to their representation. I am drawing here on my ear-
lier arguments that both literature and science, as emergent fields, were prac-
ticed as arts that sought to create knowledge. See: Spiller, Science, Reading and 
Renaissance Literature: The Art of Making Knowledge, 1580-1670 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 3–4, 1139b14–23. 
For Aristotle and the natural philosophers of the Renaissance who 
followed his model of physics, the things of art were indeed separate 
from those of nature. A scientific explanation, in Aristotle’s terms, in-
volved understanding the nature of things in a teleological sense (how 
and why they were what they were). Art and other forms of human 
invention could not lead to true knowledge because art was the prod-
uct of a human intention rather than the expression of an essential te-
leology.4 Through art, one could only learn about man and his ideas, 
not about nature or truth. At the same time, Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
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5. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI, 2, 1026a34–1027a28. 
6. William Shakespeare, The Tempest, 1.1.16–17,21–23. All citations are from the Ar-
den Shakespeare, edited by Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T. Vaughan (Lon-
don, Thompson Learning, 1999). 
made it clear that not all of nature realized its teleological end, and 
the resulting accidents, anomalies, and monstrosities could not serve 
as the basis for knowledge.5 Challenges to these two key tenets of Ar-
istotelian natural philosophy were at the center of a radical redefini-
tion of knowledge, art, and science in the late Renaissance. 
These challenges to once fundamental ideas about knowledge are 
also at the center of Shakespeare’s The Tempest. The play develops 
out of an initial conjunction of art and accident. When the play opens, 
we find ourselves in what appears to be a moment of the ultimate ex-
pression of nature’s power and man’s inability to exert control over it. 
The boatswain recognizes that the power of nature surpasses that of 
man when he rebuffs Gonzalo’s interference: “What cares these roar-
ers for the name of the king? [ ... ] If you can command these elements 
to silence [ ... ] use your authority.”6 Almost immediately. though, we 
learn that what had appeared to be brute, unchecked nature was in-
stead a piece of carefully contrived artifice. The “direful spectacle of 
the wreck” (1.2.26) was indeed a spectacle, a simulated phenomenon 
conjured up by Prospero’s “art” that became possible because an “ac-
cident most strange” (1.2.178) brought the usurped Duke’s enemies 
within his reach. 
Prospero uses his art in both the initial shipwreck and the subse-
quent manipulations of the humans on the island not for revenge, 
retribution, or even in any simple way to enable his return to power. 
Rather, the end of Prospero’s “art” is knowledge and, if at the close of 
play, Prospero suggests that what has occurred have only been “hap-
pened accidents” (5.1.250), Shakespeare may be emphasizing precisely 
what it means in the new knowledge culture of early modern England 
to deliberately and artificially create an accident to simulate reality. 
Throughout the play, Prospero seeks to make his enemies know what 
he has known. The shipwreck is a reenactment that subjects Alonso, 
Gonzalo, and Sebastian to experience a version of the initial maroon-
ing that Prospero and the infant Miranda had suffered through their 
acts: ‘’There they hoist us / To cry to th’ sea that roared to us, to sigh 
/ To th’ winds, whose pity, sighing back again, / Did us but loving 
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7. Francis Bacon, Novum Organon in Grathan Rees, ed. and trans., The Oxford Fran-
cis Bacon: The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum and Associated Texts 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), vol. 11 , aph. 98. On the play’s depiction of early 
modern worldmaking, see Roland Greene, “ Island Logic,” “The Tempest” and Its 
Travels, ed. Peter Hulme and William H. Sherman (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 138–47. 
wrong” (1.2.148–51). Prospero’s contrivances provide the mechanism 
by which characters reveal their true purpose and nature. We see in 
high relief the identities of conspirators such as Sebastian, Trinculo, 
Stephana, and perhaps even the boatswain, marked for hanging. Pros-
pero’s ultimate concern is to educate a second generation into better 
forms of knowledge (Miranda, Ferdinand, and in a failed way, Cali-
ban). From Prospero’s own perspective, the art that he calls up and 
the political ends to which he puts that art are an attempt to redress 
his own earlier failure to appropriately comprehend the relationship 
between knowledge of the “liberal arts” and the behavior of “a prince 
of power” (1.2.73, 54), an attempt to correct his once mistaken belief 
that, “my library / Was dukedom large enough” (1.2.109–110). 
At the close of the first scene, Gonzalo confronts the possibility that 
he might drown and wishes for “an acre of barren ground” (1.1.66). 
The Tempest’s island is the acre that human imagination has called 
up: it and everything that happens in that space is in some way an 
invented construct. Like the alchemist’s crucible, William Gilbert’s 
magnetic terrella, or Francis Bacon’s idea for experiments that use 
the “vexations of art” to reveal the “secrets of nature,” the island is a 
small world in which Prospero seeks to use art to control nature and, 
in doing so, create different forms of knowledge.7 Prospero is not at-
tempting to discover the properties of magnets or transmute base ele-
ments into gold, but from a philosophical perspective his art can only 
be imagined to work for the same kinds of reasons that natural philos-
ophers like Gilbert and Bacon understood their science to do so. Pros-
pero’s art stands alongside their experiments as a refutation of Aris-
totle ‘s claim that art cannot serve as a means to understand nature 
and that singular events (whether those are dismissed as anomalies, 
monstrosities, or accidents) cannot produce universal experience or 
certain knowledge. His art confounds what were for Aristotle at least 
three philosophically distinct kinds of knowledge: praxis (prudential 
decision-making), poesis (mechanical construction, craft), and scientia 
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8. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 3, 1139b 14–18. For the argument that sixteenth-
century natural philosophers were increasingly collapsing distinctions between 
prudential wisdom and praxis/poesis. see Henry S. Turner, The English Renais-
sance Stage: Geometry, Poetics and the Practical Spatial Arts, 1580–1630 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 54. 
9. Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea, 48. 
10. Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea, 84-85. 
11. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 4, 1140a 13–15. It is worth noting that the mak-
er’s knowledge tradition is a rejection of Aristotle but, like many other early mod-
ern moments of resistance to Aristotle, it does nonetheless have a philosophical 
basis in Aristotelian thought. See Metaphysics I (A), I, 981b31–34 for Aristotle’s 
comments on the degrees and kinds of knowledge that pertain to the artist and 
the “master-worker.” 
12. Rossi, Philosophy, Technology, and the Arts, 10. 
(certain knowledge of the teleological purposes of things).8 The Tem-
pest violates Aristotle’s maxims and mixes his categories in a way that 
is not specific to Shakespeare but that is in keeping with a much larger 
reworking of Aristotelian physics that helped produce a distinctively 
early modern understanding of knowledge as a form of art. 
In the early modern period, the chief challenge to Aristotelian con-
ceptions about the divide between art and nature-and the impedi-
ments that that divide posed to the development of modern forms 
of scientific knowledge—came from the mechanical arts and related 
practical craft knowledges. This challenge became possible because 
mechanical arts were not practiced under the terms of Aristotelian 
epistemology. Arts such as metallurgy, architecture, alchemy, naviga-
tion, painting, engineering, and surveying instead relied upon a very 
different epistemology, one that Antonio Pérez-Ramos has termed the 
“maker’s knowledge tradition.”9 This model of knowledge rejected the 
divide that Aristotle saw between art and practical wisdom, on the 
one hand, and scientific knowledge, on the other. The maker’s knowl-
edge tradition instead posited an integral relationship between “ob-
jects of cognition and objects of construction, and regard[ed] know-
ing as a kind of making or as a capacity to make (verum factum).”10 
From an Aristotelian perspective, this formulation is strictly inco-
herent: craft practices were simply that, instances of praxis or poe-
sis, and thus, by definition, could tell one nothing about epistemo-
logical questions.11 Breaking with Aristotelian knowledge categories, 
early modern craftsmen and artisans instead understood what they 
did as, in Paolo Rossi’s words, “a form of cognition.”12 Being able to 
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13. Zilsel, “Sociological Roots of Science.” 
14. Zilsel, “Origins of William Gilbert’s Scientific Method,” 12, 15, 24. 
15. Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific 
Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 243–4, n. 7; 28. 
16. Turner, English Renaissance Stage; see also, Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences. 
49–64. 
17. William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature, 93–120, 126–33, 234–259. 
make something was an act of knowledge; knowing something in-
volved knowing how to make it. 
This alternative knowledge tradition flourished in guild and craft 
halls, artisans’ studios, and other places in which various kinds of 
making were acquiring new cultural and social significance. In a se-
ries of groundbreaking articles, Edgar Zilsel first called attention to 
the importance of craft traditions for understanding the emergence 
of science as both a practice and an epistemological possibility in the 
early modern period.13 He argued, for instance, that we must look for 
the origins of William Gilbert’s attitude toward experimental trials—a 
key precursor to the more fully articulated experimentalism of the sev-
enteenth century—not in books, which constituted the academic tradi-
tion of existing Aristotelian epistemology, but in smithies, mines, and 
instrument makers’ workshops.14 Pamela Smith follows Zilsel’s empha-
sis in her definition of artisans as those who are trained by apprentice-
ship, rather than in schools and universities; she identifies Paracelsus’s 
stillroom and artisanal workshop as key sites in which a new “episte-
mology of handwork” was being articulated.15 Henry Turner likewise 
argues that makers’ knowledge traditions underlie and interconnect 
what might otherwise seem to be the disparate areas of geometry, six-
teenth century poetic theory. and early modern stage practice.16 The 
maker’s knowledge tradition initially arose in craft practices that were 
separate from university training and transmitted, from master to ap-
prentice, largely through oral culture. By the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, and in ways that “Prospero’s book” registers, these knowledge 
traditions entered print culture. Many of the most popular and prof-
itable books coming off of sixteenth century printing presses—books 
of secrets, recipe books, and practical manuals— were dedicated to 
forms of knowledge associated with the mechanical arts.17 
The second challenge to Aristotelian modes of knowing that is im-
portant to The Tempest is a related shift that bears on the question of 
accidents and experiments. This shift was important in four distinct 
S P I L L E R  I N  S O U T H  C E N T R A L  R E V I E W  26  (2009)       8
18. Schmitt, “Experience and Experiment”; Michael McVaugh, “Two Montpellier 
Recipe Collections,” Manuscripta 20 (1976): 175-80; Eamon, Science and the Se-
crets; Daston, “Fear and Loathing of the Imagination in Science,” Daedalus 127 
(1998): 73–95; Dear, Discipline and Experience. 
19. Dear, Discipline and Experience, 32. 
20. Daston, “Fear and Loathing,” 75–76. 
areas of inquiry: the mechanical arts traditions (which saw changes, 
through the sixteenth century, in the meanings associated with the 
terms “experiment” and “experience”); jurisprudence (which saw re-
lated developments in the concept of “matters of fact”); the inter-
section of natural history and theology (where the significance of 
miracles and marvels was important); and the mixed mathematical 
sciences (where, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, Je-
suit mathematicians began transferring practices that had originally 
been seen as only appropriate to mathematics, a discipline that was 
not classified as a science, into inquiries that had previously been 
regarded as physics).18 While these developments occurred across a 
range of largely disparate areas in the early modern intellectual land-
scape, they were all involved in some way with rehabilitating the par-
ticular and making it a viable component of what could be counted 
as knowledge. Surveying these developments, Peter Dear concludes: 
“Many local contexts of knowledge-making bear witness to the grad-
ual process by which appeal to discrete experiences became cultur-
ally dominant in European philosophy of nature.”19 The particular was 
not itself a form of knowledge, but it could in various ways be built up 
into one. What Lorraine Daston refers to as the “new-style scientific 
facts” of the seventeenth century were observations of the particu-
lar. Unlike Aristotelian experience (what happens always or most of 
the time), facts concerned themselves with what happens at a partic-
ular time and place, under particular circumstances.20 Etymologically 
akin to “fabrication” and “manufacture,” facts were also understood 
to be something made, created out of the particular. This emphasis 
on the particular led to a corollary shift from the idea of science as 
something that is to the acceptance of knowledge as something that 
must be made. 
These reconfigurations of Aristotelian forms of knowledge touched 
in different ways on the mechanical and figurative arts, poetic the-
ory and rhetoric, and the mixed mathematical sciences. Understood 
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21. Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 3–4, 21–23, 139–41; see also 
Pamela H. Smith, “Art, Science, and Visual Culture in Early Modern Europe,” Isis 
97 (2006): 83–100. 
collectively, these reassessments produced a distinctively early mod-
ern model of knowledge. This conception can be described as a be-
lief that knowledge is constructed, made or created through acts of 
human invention, rather than found or discovered. As I have argued 
elsewhere, this configuration is as important for works of literature 
as it is for those of science since art is in the early modern period 
not separate from knowledge but integral to its production. Knowl-
edge is a practice, a way of doing or making that becomes a form of 
knowing.21 
In keeping with this early modern reconfiguration of knowledge, 
The Tempest insists that knowledge is always created, a thing made, 
rather than found or passively learned. Prospero is a quintessential 
Shakespearean artist; his art is pre-Romantic and, perhaps more im-
portantly, pre-Newtonian. In the opening scenes, Prospero summons 
up knowledge through his art. This art is initially directed at Miranda, 
who is Prospero’s defining audience. Shakespeare makes clear that 
Prospero’s art depends on the presence of Miranda as an audience who 
is in some way necessary to the creation of that art. The shipwreck 
does not exist independently of Miranda’s experience of it: “O, I have 
suffered / With those that I saw suffer” (1.2.5–6). As her name sug-
gests, Miranda stands in the interval between ignorance and knowing. 
She represents and stages the process through which ignorance be-
comes knowledge, a process that defines Prospero as much as it does 
Miranda. Miranda has clearly been well educated by Prospero in a tra-
dition that exemplifies traditional scholastic and emerging humanistic 
education. He boasts that he has been her “schoolmaster” and given 
her a princely education, having “made thee more profit / Than other 
princes can, that have more time / For vainer hours, and tutors not so 
careful” (1.2.172–74). Yet, while Prospero has been able to teach Mi-
randa many things through books and tutorials, he has perhaps not 
been able to give her knowledge. At the start of the play, she remains 
“ignorant” and “naught knowing” (1.2.18) of more than just her fa-
ther’s identity. From this perspective, what Prospero fashions through 
his art is an artificial construct that will produce a new kind of expe-
rience and with it a new form of knowledge. 
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22. On wonder, see, among others, Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonder 
and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (Cambridge: Zone Books, 1998); Mary Ba-
ine Campbell, Wonder and Science: Imagining Worlds in Early Modern Europe 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Pos-
sessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992); Philip Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Thomas G. Bishop, Shakespeare 
and the Theatre of Wonder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
23. Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, trans. English Dominican Fathers, 4 vols. (Lon-
don, 1928), vol. 3, part 2, 60–61. Cited in Lorraine Daston, “Marvelous Facts and 
Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern Europe,” Critical Inquiry 18 (1991), 96. For 
Aquinas’s source in Aristotle, see Metaphysics I (A). 2, 982b12–17, 983a 14–18. 
Miranda is a figure of admiration and an embodiment of the move-
ment toward knowledge that wonder, as the intellectual passion, rep-
resents.22 Her wonder is first incited by the shipwreck and arises out 
of the disparity between what she sees (the wreck) and what Pros-
pero knows (its fabrication). The consequences to the disparity in 
their knowledges conform to Aquinas’s classic account of admiration. 
For Aquinas, admiration “arises when an effect is manifest, whereas 
its cause is hidden [...] Now the cause of a manifest effect may be 
known to one, but unknown to others [...] as an eclipse is to a rustic, 
but not to an astronomer.”23 Compared to Prospero, Miranda is ini-
tially in the position of Aquinas’s rustic: she sees the manifest effect 
of the storm and wonders because she does not understand its hid-
den cause. Aquinas’ account of admiration was part of a well-estab-
lished tradition, philosophical and theological, that sought to clas-
sify and comprehend those exceptions to the ordinary workings of 
nature that Aristotle identified as accidents. In this tradition, the sin-
gular might be either a monster (a preternatural phenomenon that 
arose out of some failure in teleological purpose) or a miracle (a su-
pernatural phenomenon produced by God). These alternatives are 
captured in Miranda’s two choices, Caliban and Ferdinand. Caliban 
is for Miranda a perverse accident, an anomaly outside nature. Mi-
randa attacks Caliban as “a thing most brutish” (1.2.60). She casti-
gates him as a “vile race,” but he remains uniquely singular because 
Prospero thwarted his attempt to rape Miranda, an act which would 
have “peopled else / This isle with Calibans” (1.2.351–52). Miranda’s 
response to Ferdinand, by contrast, follows the distinctions that Aqui-
nas makes between miracles and wonders. On first seeing Ferdinand, 
she exclaims, “I might call him a thing divine, for nothing natural / I 
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24. Aristotle, Metaphysics. VI, 3, 1027a 23. 
25. Daston, “Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence,” 109. Daston sees the move-
ment of preternatural things from natural history to natural philosophy a key 
development in the late sixteenth century. Bacon and other philosophers of the 
preternatural “shifted the marvels of nature from the periphery to the center 
of their philosophy, and attempted explanations of even the most singular phe-
nomena” (“Preternatural Philosophy,” Biographies of Scientific Objects, ed. Lor-
raine Daston [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000], 18). 
ever saw so noble” (21). Unsure of what he is, she intuitively trans-
poses Ferdinand from the natural world to the divine. If Caliban is a 
monster, Ferdinand is a miracle. 
What is most important about Miranda’s responses to Caliban and 
Ferdinand is not how closely she follows Aquinas but how radically 
she takes us away from him. To understand Shakespeare’s attitude 
toward knowledge in The Tempest, we must recognize that Miranda 
does not live in a world that Aquinas or Aristotle imagined. She expe-
riences life as an inversion of the usual scholastic understanding of 
the balance between the universal and the accidental. For Aristotle, 
most of life is lived within a consistent and undifferentiated realm of 
universals (those things which happen always or for the most part), 
but Miranda’s experience of the island is so emptied out that she lives 
almost entirely in a world comprised of singularities.24 This feature of 
the island, I would argue, identifies The Tempest as distinctively early 
modern in its epistemological assumptions. Returning to Aquinas may 
make this distinction clear. As Lorraine Daston demonstrates, Aqui-
nas used the example of eclipses to distinguish supernatural miracles 
(which came from God and which produced universal wonder) from 
preternatural wonders (singularities which might be remarkable but 
which stood outside of natural philosophy and did not constitute a ba-
sis for knowledge). His arguments were a key instance of how Aristo-
telian claims about the universal and the accidental were subsumed 
into medieval theology. By the early modern period, though, miracles 
and wonders acquire a new status. They provide the basis for a rad-
ical inversion of scholastic epistemology. The monsters and marvels 
that had once stood outside the boundaries of knowledge in the Ar-
istotelian universe now become “the first scientific facts.” As Daston 
explains: “The very traits that had previously unfitted them for use in 
natural philosophy, and which had then disqualified them from use in 
theology, made this new role possible.”25 
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27. Aristotle, Metaphysics V1.2, 1026b20–21 . 
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England (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2001), 18. Wilmore also provides 
a useful account of how Bacon rehabilitated the “accidental” into a fundamental 
source of philosophical knowledge (Culture of Accidents, 111–29). 
Miranda lives not in the world of nature imagined by Aristotle but 
in the space of experiment most fully articulated by Bacon. Her world, 
bounded and contrived as it is, is a place in which the singular is not 
excluded from knowledge but instead forms the basis for it. In the late 
sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, a traditional Aris-
totelian epistemology, which relied on experience, was replaced with 
a new proto-experimental epistemology, which instead depended on 
“singular experiences made using contrived apparatus.”26 This intel-
lectual context provides a key to understanding Prospero’s staged il-
lusions. For Aristotle, “all science is either of that which always is or 
that which is for the most part” and thus “there is no science of the ac-
cidental.”27 In the knowledge culture of early modern Europe, though, 
a science of the accidental did emerge. As Michael Witmore argues, 
questions about the epistemological status of accidents were not sim-
ply arcane philosophical or theological speculation, but were instead 
part of a “widespread early modern interest in the unexpected and 
unforeseen.”28 Under this new epistemology, anomalous events— pre-
cisely those things that did not happen all or most of the time—became 
the basis for investigation, examination, and experimentation. Sebas-
tian, Gonzalo, and the other European courtiers speculate about the 
kinds of monsters that live at the limits of imagination and philoso-
phy (3.3). More so than unicorns or men with heads in their breasts, 
Miranda is a true wonder in that she is confined to a world of care-
fully circumscribed particulars. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, 
Miranda’s world was not full enough to give her experience of the or-
dinary course of nature: 
I do not know 
One of my sex, no woman’s face remember— 
Save, from my glass, mine own. Nor have I seen 
More that I may call men than you, good friend, 
And my dear father. How features are abroad 
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I am skilless of, but by my modesty 
(The jewel in my dower), I would not wish 
Any companion in the world but you, 
Nor can imagination form a shape, 
Besides yourself, to like of. (3.1.48–58) 
Miranda cannot imagine an alternative to Ferdinand and in a way ev-
erything for her has the epistemological status of a unicorn. She has 
never experienced the multiplicity that could constitute kind and that 
would enable her to give meaning to “man” himself. 
The degree to which what Shakespeare imagines is in keeping with 
the larger intellectual shift that took early modern culture from scho-
lastic experience to early modern experiment can also be seen in the 
transformation of Ferdinand by Prospero’s “trials” (4.1.6). Ferdinand’s 
life has been precisely the opposite of Miranda’s: he has lived in the 
world and may indeed have had the occasion to know too much of 
that world (“Full many a lady / I have eyed,” he admits [3.1.39]). The 
illusions that Prospero creates—the seeming death of Ferdinand’s fa-
ther and loss of all his companions—abstract Ferdinand from that 
larger world. When Prospero asks, “What were thou if the King of Na-
ples heard thee” (1.2.429), Ferdinand’s response suggests his sense 
of what, not who, he is now: “A single thing, as I am now, that won-
ders / To hear thee speak of Naples” (1.2.433–34). Ferdinand begins 
to experience wonder at the moment that he understands himself to 
be alone, “a single thing,” and more like Miranda in his relationship to 
the world. In Bacon’s experiments, singularity did not remain a won-
der but became a tool for producing knowledge about nature and the 
world.29 By the end of The Tempest, Miranda still experiences wonder 
when she sees that Ferdinand is only one among many, but her re-
sponse is emotionally and philosophically different. Fulfilling the kinds 
of hopes that led philosophers to imagine that oddities of nature could 
be made meaningful, Miranda’s new sense of wonder transcends the 
particular to arrive at a universal of a species and a world: “O, won-
der! / How many goodly creatures are there here! / How beauteous 
mankind is! O brave new world” (5.1.181–83). 
While Miranda and Ferdinand are brought from a kind of Aquin-
ian wonder to a Baconian knowledge, Caliban stands outside this new 
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30. My concern here is with what I take to be the intellectual singularity of Caliban 
and the way in which he stands in for a model of knowledge that also implies a 
certain understanding of human potential and power. This assessment does not 
touch directly on the racial and colonial questions surrounding Caliban’s iden-
tity, but it is also not entirely separate from those questions. Emily Bartels has 
astutely argued that Caliban appears within the play as both a collective type, a 
race, and yet also as an isolated and persistently singular subject, “the only one 
of his kind” (“Forms of Race: Strachey and Shakespeare,” Shakespeare Associ-
ation of America, April 2008, 2). The dynamic that Bartels identifies in which 
Caliban seems to resist and demand categorization also carries over to the phil-
osophical issues in the play. 
31. Readers of The Tempest have had different assessments of Caliban depending on 
whether they take a universalist perspective (usually humanist or psychoana-
lytic) or a particularizing one (culturalist or post-colonial). For accounts of this 
knowledge universe. The drunk Trinculo tries to determine what kind 
of monster Caliban is: “a very shallow monster” (2.2.141–2), “a very 
weak monster” (2.2.142), “a most poor credulous monster” (2.2.143), 
“a most scurvy monster” (2.2.152), and “a most ridiculous monster” 
(2.2.160). Stephano ultimately settles on “monster” as a form of appel-
lation, if not a classification (3.2.106, 119, 134, 151). The Tempest does 
not encourage us to take Trinculo and Stephano seriously, but they are 
right here: Caliban is, in a philosophical sense at least, a monster. He 
is emphatically singular and stands outside the laws of nature and the 
predictions of man. Miranda imagines that Ferdinand must be a super-
natural being (a “thing divine, / Nothing natural”), but Stephano ini-
tially assumes that Caliban, bundled together with Trinculo, must be 
a preternatural one. He asks, “Have we devils here?” and concludes, 
“this is some monster of the isle with four legs ... a most delicate mon-
ster” (2.2.62–63, 85). Caliban does not entirely belong to the world of 
nature that is the island, but he also refuses the kind of transforma-
tion that Miranda and Ferdinand are imagined to undergo. He can-
not be educated and his philosophical singularity is expressed in the 
thwarting of his desire to reproduce (1.2.344–61). Singular and appar-
ently unredeemable, Caliban belongs in a world of Aristotelian uni-
versals but does so as a kind of monstrous accident that cannot be ac-
commodated into the new world of Baconian particulars.30 As recent 
scholarship has made clear, Caliban is imagined as a barbaric other, 
but his relationship to the Europeans as the holders of knowledge and 
power is complicated by the fact that that alterity is also expressed in 
the way that he stands in for an older knowledge order.31 
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2004), 852–57 and Julia Reinhard Lupton, “Creature Caliban,” Shakespeare Quar-
terly 51 (2000), 1–4. As early as 1996 Denise Albanese identified critical attention 
to colonialist implications of the play as “nearly an orthodoxy in itself” (New Sci-
ence, New World [Durham: Duke University Press, 1996],71) and pointed to the 
role that science and nature played in this critical shift from universalist to par-
ticularist readings of the play. Accounts that emphasize the racial and colonialist 
implications to the play include, among others, Paul Brown, ‘’’This Thing of Dark-
ness I Acknowledge Mine’: The Tempest and the Discourse of Colonialism” in Jon-
athan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, eds., Political Shakespeare: New essays in cul-
tural materialism (London: Manchester University Press, 1985), 48–71; Barbara 
Fuchs, “Conquering Islands: Contextualizing The Tempest,” Shakespeare Quar-
terly 48 (1997): 45–62; and Meredith Anne Skura, “Discourse and the Individual: 
the case of colonialism in The Tempest,” Shakespeare Quarterly 40 (1989): 42–
69. My assessment of Caliban is consistent with Lupton’s argument that “Cali-
ban’s creatureliness precedes secular humanism” (“Creature Caliban,” 4). 
The extent to which Caliban remains fixed in an older knowledge 
order can be seen in his relationship to the island. Caliban is impas-
sioned and eloquent in his descriptions of the island: 
Be not afeard. The isle is full of noises, 
Sounds and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not. 
Sometimes a thousand twanging instruments 
Will hum about mine ears; and sometimes voices, 
That if I then had waked after long sleep, 
Will make me sleep again; and then in dreaming, 
The clouds, me thought, would open and show riches 
Ready to drop upon me, that when I waked 
I cried to dream again. (3.3.135–43) 
His service to first Prospero and then Stephano and Trinculo expresses 
itself as devotion to the land. He showed Prospero “all the qualities 
0’ th’ isle, / The fresh springs, brine-pits, barren place and fertile” 
(1.2.337–39). To Stephano and Trinculo, he offers to “bring thee where 
crabs grow, / And I with my long nails will dig thee pignuts, / Show 
thee a jay’s nest, and instruct thee how / To snare the nimble mar-
moset” (2.2.164–67). Caliban’s description of the island is a kind of 
poetry, but it is one that differs fundamentally from Prospero’s art. 
Caliban describes nature, whereas Prospero masters and commands 
it. The details and particularities of nature that Caliban enumerates 
S P I L L E R  I N  S O U T H  C E N T R A L  R E V I E W  26  (2009)       16
32. Daston, “Facts and Evidence,” 111. 
entered early modern science out of the domains of history: “Baco-
nian facts were new not because they were particulars, nor even be-
cause they were preternatural. Particulars were the stuff of history, 
natural and civil, and expressly preternatural particulars had been a 
staple of both sorts of history since Herodotus and Pliny. They were 
new because they now belonged to natural philosophy, expanding its 
realm beyond the universal and commonplace.”32 Under Aristotle, the 
particular was confined to natural history; with Bacon, it became the 
basis for natural philosophy. Unlike Miranda and Ferdinand, Caliban 
remains resolutely Aristotelian in his relationship to the island that 
he so lovingly rehearses: collecting, itemizing, detailing the physical 
features of his isle, Caliban is its natural historian. Caliban in his re-
lationship to the island looks back to Aristotelian categories that were 
being displaced throughout early modern culture. Prospero’s art seeks 
a new order of knowledge, but whatever Caliban knows, he cannot 
translate his knowledge of the island into either knowledge or power. 
His curses fall on stony ground, and he creates nothing of his own. 
The Tempest’s break with Aristotelian scholasticism and the knowl-
edge traditions it represented is also captured in Prospero’s changing 
relationship to knowledge. In his former life, Prospero was a scholar. 
He did not study Zilsel’s mechanical arts, the arts of the hand, but 
instead immersed himself in the “liberal arts,” “those being all my 
study” (1.2.74,75). In a manner that followed from the kind of diver-
gence between knowledge and practice that scholasticism assumed, 
Prospero gives up the world for knowledge. “Transported / And rapt 
in secret studies,” Prospero finds that he is “neglecting worldly ends, 
all dedicated / To closeness and the bettering of my mind” (I.2.89–
90). Ultimately, like the deposed Richard II, Prospero concludes that 
his library was “dukedom large enough” (1.2.11–11). What might this 
library kingdom have contained? It is tempting to imagine for Pros-
pero a library akin to the fabled medieval libraries of Cordoba, To-
ledo, or Paris that were the conduit by which the texts and intellectual 
traditions that led to the New Science traveled across the Mediter-
ranean from Claribel’s Tunis to Western Europe. It is also possible 
to construct for Prospero a Milanese version of John Dee’s library or 
Rudolph II’s laboratory, fabled sites that mixed traditional philoso-
phy, arcane arts, and the new knowledge traditions of the mechanical 
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Renaissance (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995). 
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35. My assessment of the emergence of early modern knowledge arts focuses on the 
role of print culture. Magic, though, was a part of both early modern print and 
manuscript culture. Prospero’s book thus also stands suggestively within this 
manuscript tradition: see Barbara A. Mowat, “Prospero’s Book,” Shakespeare 
Quarterly 52 (2001): 1–33. 
arts.33 My own shelflist for Prospero, less elegant than Peter Green-
away’s Prospero’s Books, would begin with Peter Apian’s Cosmogra-
phy, Pico della Mirandola’s “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” Giambat-
tista della Porta’s Natural Magic, Marsilio Ficino’s Three Books on Life, 
the Geneva Bible, Thomas More’s Utopia, the Aldine Press editions 
that Raphael Hythloday brought to Utopia, Edward Topsell’s History 
of four-footed beasts, Alexis of Piedmont’s Secreti, Richard Hooker’s 
Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie, Machiavelli’s The Prince, John 
Dee’s “Mathematical Preface,” and Montaigne’s Essays. 
Perhaps this list is wrong in its emphasis, though, insofar as such 
texts collectively express an attitude toward the relationship between 
knowledge and power that Prospero only acquires after he has lost 
his dukedom. Prospero had understood knowledge as its own realm, 
apart from the world; once he finds himself truly outside that world 
and indeed only when he must in tum dispossess someone else to re-
gain a place even at the margins of the world, he learns the lesson 
that knowledge must be used if it is to exist because knowledge can-
not be abstracted from the human world. The knowledge of nature 
is primarily valuable as it provides a power over man. This conclu-
sion, adopted by Prospero in an exile that has taken him furthest from 
man and closest to nature, is one that Bacon had in mind when he in-
sisted that science may be of nature but must pertain to man: “human 
knowledge and human power meet in one.”34 
The idea that princes could use art to master nature and, in doing 
so, create not so much knowledge as power is also at the heart of a 
tradition that feeds into Bacon’s arguments on this subject. This tra-
dition is best exemplified by the pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum Secre-
torom (Kitāb Sirr al-Asrār) Prospero’s book—which never appears in 
the play and is not mentioned by Prospero until the closing moments 
when Prospero revokes his “rough magic” (5.1.57)—stands as a version 
of the Secretum Secretorom.35 This pseudo-Aristotelian compendium 
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of secrets was a work of moral and political philosophy (a mirror for 
princes, containing supposed letters of instruction from Aristotle to 
Alexander the Great). The many sixteenth century descendants of the 
Secretum Secretorom included the German craft and recipe booklets 
known as the Kunstbüchlein (1530s), Alexis of Piedmont’s influen-
tial Secreti (Venice, 1555), Giambattista della Porta’s Magiae naturalis 
(1588), and other collections of recipes, formulas, and “experiments.” 
Bacon’s Novum organon, and the model of science it proposes, emerges 
strongly out of this tradition. The different versions of the Secretum 
Secretorum were committed to the idea that knowledge was a form 
of power and, as a result, many versions of this popular compendium 
were overlaid with recipes and experiments in alchemy, astrology, 
physic and sustenance, magic and numerology.36 Purportedly Aristo-
tle’s secret revision to his own philosophy, this pseudo-Aristotelian 
text exemplified the challenges that the maker’s knowledge tradition 
posed to traditional scholastic epistemology. As William Eamon ex-
plains, the Secretum Secretorum became influential because it offered 
what appeared to be a remarkable key by which the abstract knowl-
edge of Aristotle’s philosophy could be put into practical and material 
use.37 The Secretum Secretorum seemed to offer the whispered reve-
lation that art and science were not, in fact, distinct; its secret recipes 
would make it possible to use art to control nature and create power. 
The secrets that the Secretum Secretorum and other Books of Se-
crets offered readers are the ones that the play invites us to imag-
ine in Prospero’s book. The play consciously does not open Prospe-
ro’s book to us. We cannot read in Prospero’s book but we can see its 
consequences. The book and the kind of knowledge that it represents 
give Prospero the ability to control nature—or at least human percep-
tions and experiences of nature. Prospero regains control over his life 
because he abandons the philosophy of the liberal arts that Aristotle 
represented and embraces a new maker’s knowledge tradition exem-
plified by this pseudo-Aristotle. In his own shifting attitudes toward 
the relationship between art and science, nature and man, and power 
and knowledge, Prospero gives us a history in small of the larger cul-
tural transformation by which Aristotelian philosophy would become 
Baconian science. 
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The Tempest is finally a play not an experiment. Natural philos-
ophers whose work followed most closely from the maker’s knowl-
edge tradition tended to emphasize the need to make knowledge and 
to do so through the evidence of the senses. While Bacon felt that “by 
far the greatest hindrance and aberration of the human understand-
ing proceeds from the dullness, incompetency, and deceptions of the 
senses,”38 he also insisted the any new science must nonetheless be-
gin in sense perception. The Tempest counters such a model in that 
whatever knowledge Prospero is able to create through his art does 
not rely on using the senses but in deceiving them. Prospero has cru-
cially worked his art on the faulty senses of his captive audience, 
rather than on nature itself. The reconciliations and resolutions of 
Act 5 are achieved through a protracted restoration of everyone to 
his and her senses: “their rising senses / Begin to chase the ignorant 
fumes that mantle / Their clearer reason” (5.1.66–68). The senses are 
not the way to knowledge, as they would be in Bacon, but a chief im-
pediment to it: Prospero thus explains to the doubting Gonzalo, “You 
do yet taste / Some subtleties 0’ th’ isle that will not let you! Believe 
things certain” (5.1.123–25). Natural philosophers such as Bacon and 
Gilbert insisted, or at least hoped, that knowledge begins with sense 
experience, but Shakespeare’s repeated emphasis in the closing scene 
on “the dullness, incompetency, and deceptions of the senses” sug-
gests that very little may have been learned by Alonso, Gonzalo, Se-
bastian, or Antonio. The play appeals to the idea that Alonso and his 
courtiers return to their “reason” through and out of what Prospero 
has done, but Alonso may also be right, in a philosophical sense, to 
conclude that “these are not natural events” (5.1.227) and Prospero 
to characterize them as “happened accidents” (5.1.250). Has Prospero 
created knowledge in Alonso, Sebastian, Gonzalo, and Ferdinand, let 
alone in Antonio? Or, looking back to Aristotle, has he just created a 
“happened accident,” an anomaly that may not be replicated, whose 
lessons may well not apply elsewhere? Our need to ask such questions 
at the close leaves us uncertain about the kind of knowledge that Pros-
pero has produced and about any future that might be created out of 
that knowledge. 
While the play remains vexed about the quality of whatever knowl-
edge can have been produced through Prospero’s art and thus about 
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any moral lessons that may have been learned by those that Prospero 
has directed his art against in this final scene, the only redemptive 
hope for knowledge is necessarily in the next generation. What we 
can see in the final scene of the outcome for Ferdinand and Miranda 
is more than just a sense of what might be possible for them person-
ally. In their fates, only hinted at, we should also see Shakespeare’s 
most direct assessment of whether art can ultimately produce knowl-
edge and what kind of know1edge that is. The reconciliation of Pros-
pero with his former adversaries is only achieved by the discovery of 
Miranda and Ferdinand together in Prospero’s cell, a space presum-
ably filled with his library of books. In a final gesture, Prospero con-
trives one more spectacle, offering Alonso “a wonder to content ye / As 
much as me my dukedom” (5.1.169–70). The connection between art 
and power, between the technologies of wonder and the facts of dynas-
tic control are, as Prospero’s comment suggests, now aligned. The two 
young lovers are playing chess and, when Prospero reveals them, the 
two young lovers “wrangle” over the kingdoms on the chessboard and 
Miranda reproaches Ferdinand, “you play me false” (5.1.172). Prospero 
had once been willing to give up his kingdom for the small world of his 
library. Miranda is willing to give up a “score of kingdoms” (5.1.173), 
but she does so only in an engagement that involves holding the world 
more firmly rather than renouncing it. Prospero’s art has again cre-
ated this new small world, but it is one that involves precisely the in-
tegration of the prudential and the political in whatever knowledge 
it creates. Over the course of the play, Shakespeare rejects a series of 
competing contemporary models for knowledge and science: knowl-
edge as the private secrets of the mage, natural philosophy as a finding 
of facts and collecting of observations, utopian thought experiments, 
and science as a God-like control over the world. As Ferdinand and 
Miranda play, The Tempest instead embraces knowledge as a collab-
orative practice that depends on the presence of an audience and thus 
uses art to transform nature within a social, human world. Situating 
The Tempest in discussions of early modern arts of knowledge allows 
us not so much to choose between transcendent art and postcolonial 
power but to see how the two are integrally connected. In the knowl-
edge culture that this play portrays, art is the way to power. 
